How to manage the growing rivalry between America and a rising China

如何应对美国和崛起中的中国之间日益激烈的竞争

Fighting over trade is not the half of it. TheUnited States and China are contesting every domain, from semiconductors to submarines and from blockbuster films to lunar exploration.The two superpowers used to seek a win-win world. Today winning seems to involve the other lot’s defeat—a collapse that permanently subordinates China to the American order; or a humbled America that retreats from the western Pacific. It is a new kind of cold war that could leave no winners at all.

贸易之争还不是中美问题的全部。美国和中国正在各个领域展开竞争，从半导体到潜艇，从电影大片到月球探索。这两个超级大国曾经寻求一个双赢的世界。但是，今天看似的胜利却潜藏着隐患——中国不会永久地服从于美国秩序；或者美国将从西太平洋撤离。这是一种新的冷战，不会留下任何赢家。

As our special report in this week’s issue explains, superpower relations have soured. America complains that China is cheating its way to the top by stealing technology, and that by muscling into the South China Sea and bullying democracies like Canada and Sweden it is becoming a threat to global peace. China is caught between the dream of regaining its rightful place in Asia and the fear that tired, jealous America will block its rise because it cannot accept its own decline.

正如我们在本期特别报道中所解释的那样，超级大国之间的关系已经恶化。美国抱怨中国通过窃取技术来欺骗自己，通过强行进入南中国海以及威胁加拿大和瑞典等民主国家，中国正在成为全球和平的威胁。中国正在恢复其在亚洲应有地位，而嫉妒的美国将阻止其崛起，因为美国无法接受自己的衰落。

The potential for catastrophe looms. Under the Kaiser, Germany dragged the world into war; America and the Soviet Union flirted with nuclear Armageddon. Even if China and America stop short of conflict, the world will bear the cost as growth slows and problems are left to fester for lack of co-operation.

潜在的灾难迫在眉睫。就像当年的德皇把世界拖入战争一样，美国和苏联也曾考虑过核末日的问题，因此，即使中国和美国停止冲突，随着经济增长放缓，问题也会因为缺乏合作基础而恶化，影响全世界的发展。

Both sides need to feel more secure, but also to learn to live together in a low-trust world. Nobody should think that achieving this will be easy or quick.

其实，中美双方都需要更有安全感，但也要学会在一个低信任度的世界里共同生活。不可能有人能够轻松或是快速的实现这一目标。

The temptation is to shut China out, as America successfully shut out the Soviet Union— not just Huawei, which supplies 5g telecoms kit and was this week blocked by a pair of orders, but almost all Chinese technology. Yet, with China, that risks bringing about the very ruin policymakers are seeking to avoid. Global supply chains can be made to bypass China, but only at huge cost. In nominal terms Soviet-American trade in the late 1980s was $2bn a year; trade between America and China is now $2bn a day. In crucial technologies such as chipmaking and 5g, it is hard to say where commerce ends and national security begins. The economies of America’s allies in Asia and Europe depend on trade with China. Only an unambiguous threat could persuade them to cut their links with it.

就像美国成功地将苏联挡在门外一样，中国很有可能也被挡在门外，这不仅是华为提供5g电信设备，本周还被两份订单封杀，而是几乎所有的中国技术都会受到如此待遇。然而，就中国而言，政策制定者正试图避免这种毁灭性打击。但是，要让全球供应链绕过中国，这个代价太高昂了。上世纪80年代末，美苏名义贸易额为每年20亿美元;美国和中国之间的贸易额现在是每天20亿美元。在芯片制造和5g等关键技术领域，很难说这种商业竞争何时结束、经贸安全何时开始。因为美国在亚洲和欧洲的盟友的经济依赖于与中国的贸易太多了。只有明确的威胁才能说服他们切断与中国的联系。

It would be just as unwise for America to sit back. No law of physics says that quantum computing, artificial intelligence and other technologies must be cracked by scientists who are free to vote. Even if dictatorships tend to be more brittle than democracies, President Xi Jinping has reasserted party control and begun to project Chinese power around the world. Partly because of this, one of the very few beliefs which unite Republicans and Democrats is that America must act against China. But how?

如果，美国袖手旁观同样是不明智的。没有任何绝对的理由说明量子计算、人工智能和其他技术必须由自由投票的科学家破解。尽管独裁政体往往比民主政体更脆弱，但中国国家主席习近平已重申了党的领导地位，并开始在世界各地展示中国的实力。正因如此，共和党和民主党联合起来，美国必须对中国采取行动。但结果如何呢？

For a start America needs to stop undermining its own strengths and build on them instead. Given that migrants are vital to innovation, the Trump administration’s hurdles to legal immigration are self-defeating. So are its frequent denigration of any science that does not suit its agenda and its attempts to cut science funding (reversed by Congress, fortunately).

首先，美国需要增强自己的实力，并在此基础上继续发展。鉴于移民对创新的重要性，特朗普政府对合法移民设置的障碍弄巧成拙。此外，它还经常诋毁任何不符合其执政的科学，并试图削减科学经费(幸运的是，被国会推翻了)。

Another of those strengths lies in America’s alliances and the institutions and norms it set up after the second world war. Team Trump has rubbished norms instead of buttressing institutions and attacked the European Union and Japan over trade rather than working with them to press China to change. American hard power in Asia reassures its allies, but President Donald Trump tends to ignore how soft power cements alliances, too. Rather than cast doubt on the rule of law at home and bargain over the extradition of a Huawei executive from Canada, he should be pointing to the surveillance state China has erected against the Uighur minority in the western province of Xinjiang.

其次，美国应该延续二战后建立起来的联盟制度的优势。但是，特朗普团队摒弃了这一制度，并在贸易问题上抨击欧盟和日本，而不是与它们合作，这也迫使中国做出改变。美国在亚洲的硬实力让其盟友放心，但唐纳德•特朗普(Donald Trump)总统忽视了软实力对巩固盟友关系的作用。他不应质疑中国国内的法治，也不应在引渡一名华为高管的问题上讨价还价，而是应该指出，中国在西部省份新疆对维吾尔族建立的监控状态。

As well as focusing on its strengths, America needs to shore up its defences. This involves hard power as China arms itself, including in novel domains such as space and cyberspace. But it also means striking a balance between protecting intellectual property and sustaining the flow of ideas, people, capital and goods. When universities and Silicon Valley geeks scoff at national-security restrictions they are being naive or disingenuous. But when defence hawks over-zealously call for shutting out Chinese nationals and investment they forget that American innovation depends on a global network.

除了集中力量，美国还需要加强防御。这涉及到中国武装自己时的硬实力，包括在空间和网络空间等新领域。但这也意味着在保护知识产权和维持思想、人员、资本和商品流动之间取得平衡。当大学和硅谷极客嘲笑国家安全限制时，他们是天真或虚伪的。但当国防鹰派人士过分狂热地呼吁将中国公民和投资拒之门外时，他们忘记了美国的创新依赖于全球网络。

America and its allies have broad powers to assess who is buying what. However, the West knows too little about Chinese investors and joint-venture partners and their links to the state.Deeper thought about what industries count as sensitive should suppress the impulse to ban everything.

美国及其盟友拥有广泛的权力来评估谁在购买什么。然而，西方对中国投资者、合资伙伴及其与政府的关系知之甚少。深入思考哪些行业被视为敏感行业，应该会抑制禁止一切的冲动。

Dealing with China also means finding ways to create trust. Actions that America intends as defensive may appear to Chinese eyes as aggression that is designed to contain it. If China feels that it must fight back, a naval collision in the South China Sea could escalate. Or war might follow an invasion of Taiwan by an angry, hypernationalist China.

与中国打交道也意味着找到建立信任的方法。在中国人看来，美国出于防御目的的行动可能会被视为旨在遏制中国的侵略。如果中国觉得自己必须反击，那么南中国海的海上冲突可能会升级。或者战争可能在愤怒的、极端民族主义的中国入侵台湾之后爆发。

A stronger defence thus needs an agenda that fosters the habit of working together, as America and the ussr talked about armsreduction while threatening mutually assured destruction. China and America do not have to agree for them to conclude it is in their interest to live within norms. There is no shortage of projects to work on together, including North Korea, rules for space and cyberwar and, if Mr Trump faced up to it, climate change.

因此，一个更强大的国防需要一个培养合作习惯的议程，就像美国和苏联在谈论削减军备的同时威胁相互确保的毁灭一样。中国和美国不需要达成一致，就能得出结论，生活在规范之中符合它们的利益。需要合作的项目并不少，包括朝鲜、太空规则和网络战，如果特朗普直面这些问题，还包括气候变化。

Such an agenda demands statesmanship and vision. Just now these are in short supply. Mr Trump sneers at the global good, and his base is tired of America acting as the world’s policeman. China, meanwhile, has a president who wants to harness the dream of national greatness as a way to justify the Communist Party’s total control. He sits at the apex of a system that saw engagement by America’s former president, Barack Obama, as something to exploit. Future leaders may be more open to enlightened collaboration, but there is no guarantee.

这样的议程需要政治家的才干和远见。现在这些东西供应不足。特朗普嘲笑全球利益，他的选民也厌倦了美国充当世界警察的角色。与此同时，中国有一位希望利用国家伟大的梦想来证明共产党完全控制的正当性的主席。他所处的体系将美国前总统巴拉克•奥巴马(Barack Obama)的参与视为可利用之物。未来的领导者可能更愿意接受开明的合作，但这并不能保证。

Three decades after the fall of the Soviet Union, the unipolar moment is over. In China, America faces a vast rival that confidently aspires to be number one. Business ties and profits, which used to cement the relationship, have become one more matter to fight over. China and America desperately need to create rules to help manage the rapidly evolving era of superpower competition. Just now, both see rules as things to break.

苏联解体30年后，单极时代已经结束。在中国，美国面临着一个自信地渴望成为第一的强大对手。商业关系和利润曾经是巩固这种关系的纽带，现在却成了另一个需要争夺的问题。中国和美国迫切需要制定规则，帮助管理快速演变的超级大国竞争时代。目前，双方都认为规则是需要打破的。

FROM：《The economist》

来自：《经济学人》杂志，网易有道翻译。

表情 点击这里取消回复。

加载中...

• Tony 6年前 (2019-05-22)

  网易有道翻译的好像还可以

  回复